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Abstract 
 
In 1985 China began its reform on the Science & Technology (S&T) sector which was 
inherited from a planned economy. The reform over the past 20 years is deemed to be a 
decisive factor in China’s science and technology progress. The paper first argues that 
two fundamental tasks of China’s S&T sector reform are to enhance scientific 
productivity and strengthen the industry-academic relationships. Subsequently, the 
reform policies are outlined within three categories: 1) reforming the funding system, 2) 
improving R&D management 3) strengthening industry-academic relationships.  
 
The evolution of S&T institutes such as the Chinese Academy of Science is examined to 
provide micro-level evidence of policy impacts. The scientific output of China’s S&T 
sector did achieve the remarkable improvement in the reform period, but we also observe 
the rapidly growing investment from the governments flew into the sector. The 
evaluation of the performance of the reform needs to examine the scientific productivity 
of the sector. Therefore, we proceed to measure the scientific productivity of China’s 
S&T institutes based on the R&D input and output data in the aggregate and provincial 
level. The Polynomial Distributed Lag model is utilized to uncover the structure of the 
 2 
lag between R&D input and output. The findings based on the aggregate data and 
provincial data confirm that the scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes has been 
decreasing since 1990s. These results call for the future actions that can contribute to 
enhancing the scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
China’s science and technology (S&T) has achieved impressive progress in the past two 
decades. Shown in Table 1, over the period of 1991-2002, the ratio of Chinese “Science 
Citation Index (SCI)” papers to the world total increased from 1.07 percent to 4.18 
percent.1 The patent application of the S&T institutes almost doubled. The contract value 
of technology transfer projects in 2002, measured by 1990 constant price was two and a 
half times of the figure in 1991. In a global context, the number of Chinese SCI papers 
soared at a two-digit speed from 1998 to 2002, far surpassing its counterparts in the world 
as seen in Table 2. In 1998, China ranked 9th in the world in terms of the number of SCI 
papers, but in 2002 its position ascended to 5th. The citation count of China’s SCI papers 
also shows an upward trend.  The count number in the period of 1993-2003 was 30 
percent greater than those in the period of 1992-2002 (Figure 1). 
 
(Here insert Table 1) 
(Here insert Table 2) 
(Here insert Figure 1) 
 
The increasing budget appropriation and outlay from various government levels played 
an overwhelming role in the rise of China’s S&T sector. Reform in China’s S&T 
institutes, beginning in 1985 is deemed to be a decisive factor in the progress of the entire 
                                                 
1
 Science Citation Index, Science Citation Index Expanded, Engineering Index and Index to Scientific & 
Technical Proceedings are widely used academic publication index systems, which are developed by 
Thomson ISI, based in US. 
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sector. Drastic sector reorganization, unprecedented government investment, and sharply 
increasing scientific output have all resulted in much attention which are directed toward 
China’s S&T institutes from the international scientific community (Mervis and Yang, 
2003). 
 
In this paper, the so-called “China’s S&T institutes” are defined to include three groups 
of R&D organizations: the sub-institutes of the Chinese Academy of Science; the 
institutes affiliated with various ministries and other central governmental agencies; and 
the institutes affiliated with local governments. Taken together, these three groups of 
R&D institutes amounted to 5,793 in 1986, though they decreased to 4,347 in 2002. 
According to the various versions of China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology, in 1995, the aforementioned institutes hired 1.01 million staff; however, in 
2002 only 590 thousand employees remained on their payrolls.  
 
The Chinese S&T reform system dates back to 1985 when “The Resolution of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Structural Reform of the Science and 
Technology System” was issued. By launching this reform, Chinese leaders were eager to 
expand the successful changes in the agriculture sector that took place in the late 1970s to 
the industrial and S&T sectors. One of the direct impacts of this S&T system reform is 
that many new R&D units had been established and developed inside the universities and 
other enterprises after 1985. Accordingly, the S&T institutes which formerly had 
undertaken almost all the R&D activities in the planned era have been losing their 
dominance in the country’s innovation system. Table 3 shows the declining importance 
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of the S&T institutes vis-à-vis the universities and the enterprises in the period of 1987-
2002. This dynamic change is the outcome of the government’s policy that seeks to 
strengthen industrial R&D. It is important to notice that the growth of the R&D capability 
in industry and academia did not come as a sacrifice in the development of S&T institutes. 
The growth of R&D input and output of the S&T institutes in the 1990s, measured by the 
absolute value is evident in Table 3.  
 
(Here insert Table 3) 
 
The transformation of the S&T system in the post-socialist countries has been discussed 
in literature in the context of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The 
representative works were written by Dyker and Radosevic (1999), Meske (2002), 
Radosevic and Auriol (1999), Jasinski (2003), Radosevic (2003), and Mirskaya and 
Rabkin (2004), etc. The same issue in the context of China was analyzed by Cao (2002), 
Fischer and von Zedtwitz (2004), Gu (1995), Huang, et al. (2004), IDRC (1997), Liu and 
White (2001a), OECD (2002), Suttmeier and Cao (1999), US Embassy Beijing (2002), 
World Bank (2001), and Xue (1997), etc. In these works, the drawbacks of the so-called 
“centrally planned S&T system” were highlighted. The corresponding remedy policies 
implemented in these transitional countries were also emphasized. In this paper, we 
would like to go further to identify which drawbacks are the most fundamental and what 
are the priority issues of the S&T system reform in the post-socialist countries such as 
China. 
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The low efficiency of the planned S&T system was widely criticized by the works such 
as Hanson and Pavitt (1987), Meske (1998), OECD (1969) and Radosevic (1999). It is 
believed that before the S&T system reform, the scientific productivity of China’s S&T 
institutes also remained at a low-level. In this paper, the scientific productivity is 
measured based on inputs such as R&D expenditure and outputs such as patent 
application or publication. If a low scientific productivity prevailed in the planned system 
in China, it is inquisitive to ask whether on-going reform has enhanced the efficiency of 
S&T institutes in China. Is the explosive increase of China’s scientific publications in 
recent years ascribed to the scientific productivity augmentation or only because of the 
larger amount of the governmental investment? In order to answer these questions, we 
follow the pioneer ideas appearing in Adams and Griliches (1996a, 1996b) and Crespi 
and Geuna (2004) to measure the scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes. The 
result from this empirical exercise not only serves to evaluate the policy performance of 
the S&T system reform in the past two decades, but also helps to point out the focus of 
future efforts.  
 
In short, the remaining parts of the paper are organized to achieve its objectives. Section 
2 identifies the fundamental tasks China needs to accomplish in its S&T system reform; 
Section 3 categorizes the complex reform policies during the past decades; Section 4 
provides two case studies to observe the micro-level impacts of S&T system 
transformation; Section 5 conducts the empirical analysis to measure the scientific 
productivity of China’s S&T institutes and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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Section 2: Fundamental tasks of the S&T system’s transformation in China  
 
The discrepancies of the S&T systems in centrally planned economies and in market 
economy countries were identified early in the works of OECD (1969) and Hanson and 
Pavitt (1987).2 It was already proved by the history of the 20th century that the capitalist 
system made better use of the human and physical resources to promote innovation than 
the centrally planned system. Higher labor productivity and better welfare were also 
achieved by the former (Kornai, 2000). In terms of S&T, the higher performance was 
achieved in the west industrialized countries, which made the governments in China and 
the CEECs gradually recognize the institutional constraints of the planned S&T system. 
Some remedy initiatives were subsequently designed and launched in the late 20th century. 
The reform in China was put on agenda in the middle of the 1980s. The similar 
transformation also began in the CEECs before their “velvet revolution” in 1989, but was 
only completely launched after the beginning of the 1990s (Radosevic, 2003). 
 
(Here insert Table 4) 
 
The objective of the transformation was to transform the rigid, segmented and inefficient 
plan-oriented S&T system into a highly dynamic, interactive and efficient system such as 
those in the leading industrialized countries. The two Figures (2 and 3) describe the 
objective of Chinese S&T system’s transition, which is analogous to the case of East 
Germany (Meske, 1994). Among the numerous missions that China needed to 
                                                 
2
 The summary of their findings is in Table 4. 
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concentrate on during the two decade long reform, two fundamental tasks had always 
been considered critical. The first was establishing an effective linkage across the agents 
inside the S&T system, especially the link between R&D institutes and enterprises. The 
second vital task was enhancing the scientific productivity of the S&T system. Whether 
the two tasks had been accomplished and how well they had been achieved in a large 
degree decided the performance of the S&T system reform in China. 
 
(Here insert Figure 2) 
(Here insert Figure 3) 
 
The new linkages among the agents of the innovation system surely need to be re-
established in the transformation from linear planned system to the interactive system. 
Therefore, the importance of first task, i.e. linking the agents in the innovation system, is 
self-evident. As far as the second task, we are not the first ones who noticed that lower 
scientific productivity existed in the centrally planned economies. Dyker and Radosevic 
(1999) and Meske (2002) already questioned the relevance of the bulky S&T system in 
the post socialist countries. The S&T sector built in the planned era were considered as a 
“liability” instead of as “asset” in the economic transition. Here, further evidence is 
provided to show the seriousness of the low efficiency of planned S&T system (see 
Figure 4 and 5). 
 
(Here insert Figure 4) 
(Here insert Figure 5) 
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In Figure 4 and 5, the CEECs and China placed themselves below the fit line, which 
reveals their low productivity of producing the “triadic” patent families. The triadic 
patent families are the proxy variable of a country’s R&D output, representing the 
technological competitiveness of the country (OECD, 2001, 2004). The post socialist 
countries truly devoted the abundant capital and human resources into the R&D activities, 
but the achievement measured by the invention in the international frontier level were 
relatively less. The low input-output ratios of the most post socialist countries are 
impressive because after one decade of reform, their S&T systems still showed the low 
efficiency of producing high value R&D output. It is necessary to note that because of the 
lag between the R&D capital and human resource input and the output, the input in 1999 
can only account for little or nothing of the output in 1999. Linking them together is just 
for simplifying the analysis and would not harm the consistence of the conclusion. 
 
Section 3: Policies and the performance of the S&T institutes’ transformation in 
China 
 
In the past 20 years, various policies regarding S&T system transformation have been 
implemented in China. The trial-and-error reform process makes the policy issue vague 
and hard to discern. However, given the fundamental tasks of China’s S&T system 
reform in the previous section, we are able to classify the reform policies into three 
groups, which are 1) reforming the R&D funding system, 2) improving R&D 
management in the S&T institutes and 3) strengthening the industry-academic 
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relationship. The classification reduces the complexity of the policy issue and helps us 
grasp the far-reaching change of China’s S&T system in the past two decades. 
 
3.1 The reform of the S&T funding system 
 
At the beginning of the reform, the Chinese government quickly realized that increasing 
the budget appropriations of the S&T institutes would not solve the efficiency problem 
completely. The centrally planned funding mechanism based on scale of the institutes or 
number of the staff would squander much of the resource invested towards the S&T 
sector. By recognizing it, shortly after issuing “the resolution” in 1985, the government 
transferred the responsibility of allocating the S&T funding from the Ministry of Treasure 
to the State Science and Technology Commission, which later turned into Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST). In the following years, while China’s government 
steadily increased the S&T budgetary appropriation, a series of programs were developed 
to manage the R&D projects under the leadership of MOST.3 In addition, the National 
Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) was established to manage the funding to 
basic research, based on evaluating the merit of research proposals (Xue, 1997). The 
annual growth rates of the central government’s appropriation to S&T activities were 
significantly higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Since the second half of the 1990s, the 
budgetary support had even rocketed at a two-digit speed (Table 5). The strengthened 
governmental R&D inputs contributed to the growth of China’s ratio of Gross 
Expenditure on R&D expenditure/GDP in the recent years (Figure 6).  
 
                                                 
3
 The description of Chinese S&T programs is available in Huang, et al. (2004). 
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(Here insert Table 5) 
(Here insert Figure 6) 
 
Currently, the 863 Program, 973 Program and Key Technology R&D Program (Gong 
Guan Program) consisted of three major funding programs managed by MOST. The 
budgets of the three programs reached 5.5, 0.9, 1.5 billion RMB in 2004, respectively.4 In 
2004, the budget of NSFC amounted to 2.246 billion RMB. The number of the received 
research proposals by NSFC topped 42,984, increased by 21.8 percent from the figure in 
2003 and were around four times of the figure in 1987 (State Science and Technology 
Committee, 1988). The merit-based public R&D funding system was the major 
achievement of China’s two decade long S&T system reform. Its establishment ensured 
the improvement of scientific productivity, which has never been given emphasis in the 
planned era.  
 
3.2 The improvement of the R&D management in the S&T institutes 
 
Improving the management in the S&T institutes is another measure that China’s 
government embraced in an effort to enhance scientific productivity. Between 1985 and 
1987, the system of “working position title” such as “Professor, Associated Professor, 
Researcher, Associated Researcher, etc.” was established. The position system coupled 
with the salary differentiation policy motivated the research staffs and encouraged the 
mobility of human resources. After the late 1980s, the directors of the S&T institutes 
were obliged to sign working contracts with the governments. At the same time, they 
                                                 
4
 The exchange rate of US Dollar to RMB was 1:8.27 at the end of 2004. 
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were granted more autonomy for personnel, finance, property management and 
international cooperation.  
 
The more ambitious reform known as the “Knowledge Innovation Program” was 
launched in 1998 in the Chinese Academy of Science. The program aimed to consolidate 
the Academy through reducing the 68,000 permanent positions to 30,000 by 2010 via 
retirements and re-assigning people to alternate positions. The remaining positions were 
given to the most productive staff (Science, 2001). While the emphasis was given to 
reducing redundant personnel, the efforts were also made to recruit the overseas Chinese 
scientists. According to the US National Science Foundation (2001), more than 21,600 
Chinese earned Science and Engineering (S&E) Doctorates at US universities over the 
period of 1986-98, which is around 7.5 percent of all S&E Doctorates in US universities. 
The large scale “brain drain” in China has decreased in recent years largely through 
active expatriate scientist recruitment programs (Cao, 2002; Huang et al., 2004). Since 
the 1990s, the modern R&D management experience in advanced countries has been 
introduced to China (Zhao, 2003). The attention of the policy-makers was also drawn to 
some issues currently debated in the west countries, such as the intellectual property right. 
Through learning from the West, China’s institutes modernized their R&D management 
and better exploited the value of the abundant S&T human resources in the sector. 
  
3.3 Strengthening the academy and industry relationship 
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Strengthening the industry-academic relationship was given emphasis in the “Resolution” 
of 1985 in China. The government designed a two-fold policy, push-side and pull-side, to 
build the linkages between industry and academia.  
 
On the one hand, the “push-side” policy executed in the 1980s gradually reducing the 
government’s budgetary appropriation to the S&T institutes. This strategy succeeded to 
force institutes to turn towards enterprises to earn revenue. The technical service 
provided to the enterprises and the joint R&D projects financed by the industry became 
more important to the S&T institutes because they brought in an increasing proportion of 
the total revenue of the institutes. Xue (1997) reported that the ratio of government 
appropriation to the budget of the S&T institutes decreased by 5 percent on average each 
year from 1986 to 1993. After 1985, S&T institutes, especially those doing experiment 
and development were encouraged to merge into enterprises. The newest round of reform 
after 1999 even went further to transform hundreds of S&T institutes into enterprises or 
non-profit organizations. Meanwhile, the government concentrated its funding on the 
unchanged institutes that primarily conduct basic research (Huang, et al., 2004). 
 
On the other hand, the “pull-side” policy focused on the establishment of the “technology 
market” which facilitated the technology transfer from academic to industry. The transfer 
was promoted by the “Technology Contract Law” taking effect on Nov. 1, 1987 and the 
subsequent relevant regulations. The registered contract value of the technology transfer 
projects achieved the remarkable growth during 1990s.5 In addition, the spin-off 
enterprise was also strongly promoted by the government. Gu (1995) reported that the 
                                                 
5
 See Table 1. 
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first spin-off enterprise from Chinese S&T institutes was set up in 1980, but the strong 
promotion led by governmental “Torch Program” only initiated in 1998. The program 
supported hundreds of Science Park and incubators across the country (Huang et al., 
2004). Promoted by the government’s S&T policy, Chinese spin-off enterprises showed 
the dynamism in their access to new technology, efficient corporate governance, 
aggressive business strategy and strong learning capability (Lu, 2001). Some spin-off 
companies have grown up to compete in the international market, such as the computer 
company Lenovo. It was spun off from the Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese 
Academy of Science in 1984 and in late 2004 acquired the IBM personal computing 
division to create the world's third largest PC business with approximately US$12 billion 
annual revenue in 2003 (Lenovo, 2004). 
 
 
Section 4: Transformation of S&T institutes in Chinese Academy of Science: Two 
cases 
 
In this section, the micro-level impacts of China’s S&T institute reform are presented by 
the following two case studies. The two chosen institutes, namely, Institute of Chemistry 
(ICCAS) and former Beijing Scientific Instrument R&D Center were both affiliated with 
the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) before the transformation. The study only 
focuses on their transition starting in 1998 in the framework of “Knowledge Innovation 
Program”.  
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ICCAS was founded in 1956. It employed 448 staffs, including 90 professors and 129 
associate professors by the end of 2003. 380 PhD students and 220 Master students 
enrolled in the institute (Institute of Chemistry, 2004a). It hosts three National Key 
Laboratories, four Key Laboratories of the Academy and one National Center for 
Chemical Analysis and Testing. It has been undertaking a variety of large R&D projects 
funded by the 973 Program, 863 Program and NSFC, etc. Its scientific publications 
measured by Science Citation Index papers ranked first among the S&T institutes in 
China in 2002. Because of its predominant role in the Chinese chemistry research 
community, it has been selected to implement the pilot reform led by “Knowledge 
Innovation Program” in 1998.  
 
With the support of the “Knowledge Innovation Program”, the following institutional 
reform took place in ICCAS after 1998. First, the executive power was fully assigned to 
the director of ICCAS. A council composed of the representatives from the governments, 
NSFC, CAS and scientists, was established to review the development strategy, the 
general operation, and the annual budget, revenue and expenditure of the institute. 
Second, an international evaluation committee was organized to appraise the 
development objective and research performance of the institute. Third, the new salary 
system was established to motivate the staff to become more productive. In the new 
system, the salary of staff consisted of three parts: basic salary, position allowance and 
performance allowance. Fourth, the human resource development strategy was modified. 
The new objective was increasing the proportion of the young staff (age below 45) to 75 
percent and augmenting the ratio of the mobile researchers (visiting, post doctoral, 
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doctoral and master researchers) to the permanent staff to 150 percent. In sum, these 
policy actions successfully boosted the R&D output of the institute, which is proven by 
the growing publication and patent application (Figure 7 and 8). 
 
(Here insert Figure 7) 
(Here insert Figure 8)  
 
Before 1998, ICCAS had already co-founded four high technology companies, which 
were engaged in producing new materials such as nano-polymer and functional nano-
interface materials. It is easier for ICCAS to transfer the new technology generated from 
its successful R&D projects to these partly owned high-tech companies. The innovation 
demand is also easily transmitted from these subsidiary companies to the ICCAS. After 
1998, by selling some shares of these companies to the strategic collaborator, ICCAS 
transformed its subsidiary companies into stock companies. It is expected that the new 
stock companies with a clear ownership structure can establish effective corporation 
governance and achieve rapid growth in the future.  
 
The former Beijing Scientific Instrument R&D Center was established in 1958. It not 
only conducted scientific research but also produced scientific instruments. In 1999 the 
center employed 348 S&T staff and owned two branch companies. The revenue was a 
little more than 10 million RMBs. Although the two branch companies already attempted 
to sell their products in the market before 1999, the performance was severely weakened 
by the rigid management structure and poor corporation governance of the enterprise. 
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At the end of 1999, the whole center was transformed into a new company named KTD, 
in the framework of “Knowledge Innovation Program”. The new company was jointly 
owned by CAS and its employees. In CAS’s report, the advantages of the transformation 
were explicitly summarized as follows. First, the reform facilitated the new company to 
establish effective corporation governance. Under the condition of a clear-cut ownership 
structure, economizing the resources and pursuing better performance became the natural 
principles of the daily operation. These basic business principles had never been 
implemented in the former center without the ownership reform. Second, the staff joined 
in the social insurance system through the support of CAS, which unloaded the financial 
burden of the new company. Third, managers and employees were better motivated by 
the rule of market economy, such as larger return associated with higher risk. Fourth, the 
R&D managers in the new company paid more attention to the commercial value of the 
R&D projects instead of merely focusing on their pure technological advance. In all, the 
transformation policy liberalized the growth potential of the former R&D center. In 2002, 
KTD achieved revenue of 96 millions RMB, or 9 times the figure in 1999. The profit 
reached 18 million RMB in 2003. In such a short period, KTD successfully transformed 
itself from a small S&T institute without patch production capacity into a high-tech 
company with market-oriented R&D capabilities. 
 
Section 5: Scientific productivity of Chinese S&T institutes during the reform 
period 
 
 16 
As we discussed previously, during the reform period, various policies have been put into 
effect to improve the scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes. This initiative has 
been fundamentally imperative for China that it has become a priority for the past two 
decades. However, few attempts have been made to measure the change of scientific 
productivity of China’s S&T institutes, or namely evaluate the reform policy performance. 
Previous works such as Liu and White (2001b) analyzed the regional innovation 
productivity in China by evaluating patent data from the periods of 1985-1995, but their 
arguments were weakened by the ad-hoc treatment of the lag structure of inputs and 
outputs. In this paper, we intend to fill the vacancy of that literature. 
 
Additionally, the R&D investment from the Chinese government has increased in an 
unprecedented rate recently (Table 3 and 5), reflecting the leaders’ will of building the 
long term economic prosperity on the increasing S&T contribution. The utilization of the 
growing governmental R&D funding has been widely debated inside China, and even in 
the international science community.6 Whether the R&D output has increased 
proportionally with the recent fast growing R&D input or whether the governmental 
R&D investment has been best utilized is the focus of the debate. Our measurement of 
the scientific productivity can provide the convincing answer to these questions. 
 
5.1 Method 
 
                                                 
6
 See two issues of Nature Special Edition, China Voice I and II. We cite several articles from these two 
supplements in the following discussion. 
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Following Adams and Griliches (1996a, 1996b), we adopt a scientific production 
function (function (1), log-linear form) to estimate the scientific productivity.  
 
(1) 
 
where y is logarithm of the research output which can be measured by paper, citation or 
patent, W(r) is the logarithm of a distributed lag function of the past R&D expenditure, 
representing the stock of R&D investment, X is a set of control variables, normally 
including a time trend variable t to control the changes of the variables over time, wheres 
u represents all the other unaccounted factors contributing to the output. The key issue of 
this function is the specific form of the W(r) and its estimation.  
 
Crespi and Geuna (2004) utilized the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) model as the form 
of W(r) to analyze the data of the 14 OECD countries in the period of 1981-2002. The 
proper lag structure can be seearched through various information criteria in the PDL 
model. Thus, the method is able to trace the full impact of past R&D input on output, 
which can not be found completely through the ad hoc lag structure proposed by Adams 
and Griliches (1996b) and Liu and White (2001b). Following Crespi and Geuna (2004), 
we base our analysis on the following polynomial distributed lag model (Quantitative 
Micro Software, 2002) as 
 
(2) 
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(3) 
 
where c is a pre-specified constant given by  
 
 (4)                                          



−
=
2/)1(
2/)(
k
k
c                                                                    
 
When running the regression, the function (2) is substituted by  
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Once the  is estimated from the function (5),  can be recovered straightforward through 
function (3) since  is a linear transformation of . The constant c is included only to 
avoid numerical problems that arise from colinearity and does not affect the estimates of 
. The minimal value of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) indicates the appropriate lag length j of the model (Brockwell and Davis, 
),...1,0()(......)()( 2210 pkjcjcjcj ppj >=−++−+−+= δδδδβ
if p is even 
if p is odd 
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1991; Crespi and Geuna, 2004). The definitions of the AIC and SIC are given in the 
following equations 
 
(7)                                         AIC = − 2 ( l ⁄ n ) +  2 ( s ⁄ n ) 
(8)                                         SIC = − 2 ( l ⁄ n )+ s log ( n ) ⁄ n 
 
where l is the value of the log of the likelihood function with the s parameters estimated 
using observations n (Quantitative Micro Software, 2002). Based on the equation (5), 
here s = p+3. Knowing that the full effect of R&D expenditure in the higher education 
sectors of the 14 OECD countries take 6 years to occur, i.e. j=6 (Crespi and Geuna, 2004), 
we start to search the lag length from a lag of 6 years in our analysis on China. We look 
for the right polynomial degree p by testing sequential unit reduction of its value from the 
initial value of 5.  
 
After the s are obtained from the estimation of the function (2), we proceed to calculate 
the growth of scientific productivity between the period t and t-1 according to the 
following equation 
 
(9)                   Scientific Productivity Growth = 
=
−−−−
−−−
k
j
jtjtjtt rryy
0
11 )(ˆ)( β                  
 
where 
jβ
∧
 is the estimated coefficient of the function (2). 
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When reporting the growth of scientific productivity, we may present the annual 
scientific productivity growth rate. The growth rate from time t to time t+1 is commonly 
taken to be (Scientific Productivity t+1 – Scientific Productivity t)/ Scientific Productivity t. 
Since ln(1+r) is approximately equal to r for small r, the scientific productivity growth 
rate can be approximated by the difference in logarithms, i.e. ln Scientific Productivity t+1 
– ln Scientific Productivity t. Therefore, the average annual scientific productivity growth 
rate between the period s and t is obtained by (ln Scientific Productivity t – ln Scientific 
Productivity s)/(t-s). 
 
5.2 Data 
 
The data of Chinese S&T institutes are from two sources: 1) China Statistical Yearbook 
on Science and Technology (Zhong Guo Ke Ji Tong Ji Nian Jian, hereafter it is called 
“Yearbook”) and 2) Data Set of S&T Organizations (Ke Ji Ji Gou Tong Ji Shu Ju Ji, 
hereafter called “Dataset”). The first China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology was published in 1991, covering the data of 1990. The Data Set of S&T 
Organizations was firstly issued in 1986, publishing the annual statistic data of China’s 
S&T institutes. 
 
It is worth noting that the Chinese S&T statistics system was established less than 20 
years ago. The early S&T data were more problematic than the recent ones, which poses 
difficulty to our analysis based on time series. Moreover, the early versions of the data 
sources only included fewer statistical indicators. For instance, the usual R&D input 
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indicator such as R&D intramural expenditure was not reported in the early period. 
Therefore, we have to adopt the more consistent “expenditures of R&D projects”, instead 
of “R&D intramural expenditure” as the R&D input data in the analysis. The R&D output 
is measured here by “the count of papers published in the international journals, books 
and conference proceedings” (Ke Ji Lun Wen, Guo Wai Fa Biao, hereafter called 
“international paper”) and “the count of the patent applications in Chinese patent office” 
(hereafter called “patent application”). The papers published abroad are considered with 
higher equality than those published in the domestic journals and proceedings. Their 
quality is more stable than that of the domestic publications as well (Moed, 2002; Ren 
and Rousseau, 2002).  
 
To estimate the function (2), the R&D project expenditure and patent application data are 
taken from the “yearbook”. The international papers data are from “dataset”. All of data 
series cover the period of 1986-2003. These data are aggregate data in the country level, 
collected from all the S&T institutes in China. Utilizing the coefficients of s obtained 
from the estimation result of the function (2), we can calculate the aggregate scientific 
productivity of China’s S&T institutes through the equation (9). 
 
In order to test the robustness of the aggregate scientific productivity, we take advantage 
of the provincial level data in the “dataset” to re-calculate the scientific productivity of 
the S&T institutes in some provinces. The comparison of the aggregate data result and 
the provincial data result would reach a robust conclusion of the scientific productivity of 
China’s S&T institutes in the past decades. The provincial R&D project expenditure data 
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and publication data in the “dataset” cover the period of 1991-1995 and 1997-2003. The 
provincial patent data solely cover the period of 1992-1995 and 1997-2003. This means 
all 1996 data in the “dataset” are missing. Taking account of the fact that these three data 
series are rather smooth, namely, without much variation between two neighboring years, 
we fill the vacancy of the 1996 data with the average of 1995 and 1997 data.  
 
All the expenditure series are converted by China’s GDP deflator into 1990 constant 
price. Figure 9 displays the aggregate data from the “Yearbook” for estimating the 
function (2). All three data series show the evident upward trend. Before running the 
function (2), we need to test whether the data series are with unit roots or with 
deterministic time trends. If the test rejects the hypothesis of unit root, it would justify 
our including a time trend variable t into the function (2), otherwise, we have to 
differentiate the data before the estimation.7 However, the limited number of the available 
observations makes it impossible to achieve the accurate result by means of some unit 
root test methods, including Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979), Phillips-Perron (1998) 
and GLS-detrended Dickey-Fuller (Elliot et al., 1996). Fortunately the method of KPSS 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) was not affected by this difficulty. Based on the result of 
KPSS method (Table 6), the judgment whether the data series are with unit roots depends 
on the level of significance we choose. This means we can not safely reject or accept the 
null hypothesis on the basis of the limited observations.  
 
(Here insert Figure 9) 
(Here inset Table 6) 
                                                 
7
 There is detailed discussion of this issue in Hamilton (1994). 
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Because of the ambiguity in the econometric result, we would like to examine this issue 
from the realistic perspective. The reality is that the Chinese government did attempt to 
increase R&D funding and improve the performance of the S&T sector in the past years. 
Therefore, the R&D data series, having an obvious stable upward trend would be better 
analyzed with the deterministic time trends, instead of with the unit roots. Likewise, the 
similar inference that the country's aggregate R&D input and output data series are with 
the deterministic time trends were also made based on the data of the OECD countries. 
Crespi and Geuna (2004) rejected the unit root hypothesis in their test on the 14 OECD 
countries’ R&D input and output data. All in all, we do not differentiate the data before 
running the function (2). 
 
Table 7 provides some general information of the provincial level data from the “dataset”. 
It demonstrates that the eleven out of thirty one provinces in China (hereafter called “top 
eleven” provinces), spent around 80 percent of national R&D project expenditures in 
1991 and 2003. About 80 percent of China’s international paper publications and patent 
application were also concentrated in these eleven provinces. These mean that the “top 
eleven” provinces absorbed the majority of R&D resources in China and produced a 
significant proportion of R&D output in the country. Furthermore, the ranks of these 
provinces varied little between 1991 and 2003. Thus, we simplify our calculation of the 
scientific productivity in the provincial level by focusing on these eleven provinces 
instead of presenting a result embracing 31 provinces.  
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 (Here insert Table 7) 
 
5.3 Result  
 
In the estimation result of function (2) (Table 8), by examining the AIC and SIC values 
we choose the 7 lags and 5 lags as the optimal lag structures for the publication and the 
patent data, respectively. The proper polynomial degree of the model for publication is 
3rd because the F-statistic value turned to be significant when the degree is reduced from 
3rd to 2nd. Likewise, the right degree of the model for patent is determined to be 1st. This 
proper function form reveals that in China’s S&T institutes the full effect of the R&D 
investment on the international publication takes 7 years to occur and its total effect on 
patent application lasts 5 years.  
 
(Here insert Table 8) 
 
The sum of lags represents the long term elasticity of the R&D output and input. Our 
result shows the long term elasticity of publishing international papers and R&D project 
expenditure in China’s S&T institutes is around 0.8 and the elasticity of patent 
application and R&D investment is approximately 2. That is, a 1 percent increase of the 
R&D investment in China’s S&T institutes leads to 0.8 percent growth of the 
international papers and 2 percent growth of the patent application.  
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With the s obtained from the function (2), we calculate the aggregate scientific 
productivity growth rate through the equation (9) (Table 9). By measuring the output as 
patent application, we can trace the scientific productivity growth rate of China’s S&T 
institutes until the early period of 1991/1992. But when output is measured by publication, 
we only can find the scientific productivity as early as in the period of 1993/1994 because 
of the difference of lag structure. The average annual scientific productivity growth rate 
in terms of publication is -2.9 percent and in terms of patent it is -9.5 percent. 
 
(Here insert Table 9) 
 
The finding of the deteriorating scientific productivity in China’s S&T institutions in 
1990s from the aggregate data is confirmed by the provincial data result in Table 10. The 
weighted averages of the scientific productivity growth rates of the “top eleven” 
provinces are negative, whenever the output is measured by the publication or patent data. 
It is important to remember that the reporting period of the provincial data result is 
different from that of the aggregate data result, because the early period provincial data 
are not available in the “dataset”. For this reason, we modify the reporting period of the 
aggregate data result to form a comparison with the provincial data result in Table 10. 
The “top eleven” provinces’ performance in terms of international publication was worse 
then the national average level in the period of 1998-2003, but if we measure the 
scientific productivity by patent application, the S&T institutes in these provinces 
outperformed those in the other regions in the period of 1996-2003. It is worth noting the 
exceptional performance was achieved by the S&T institutes in Shang Hai and Gan Su. 
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The scientific productivity of the S&T institutes in these two provinces, measured by the 
publication or patent data, did achieve a continuous improvement. The enhanced 
performance of the S&T institutes in Shang Hai (ranked 2nd among the 31 provinces in 
2003 in terms of R&D input scale) and Gan Su (ranked 10th) is worthy of the further 
research, which could point out a possible direction of future reform actions. 
 
(Here insert Table 10) 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The worsening scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes certainly casts doubt on 
the policy performance of the on-going S&T system reform. As we discussed previously, 
a well-functioned funding system and efficient R&D management are crucial to the 
success of R&D activities in a transitional country such as China. If these systems failed 
to perform well, the best R&D proposal would not be supported and excellent scientists 
would lose their motivation to pursue first class research, which would be reflected by 
declining productivity in the long run. 
 
Our concern resulted from the quantitative analysis is neither astonishing nor “first time 
invention”. The critical viewpoints of China’s recent S&T system’s reform were 
summarized by various authors in the two series of supplement of Nature- China Voice I 
and II in 2003 and 2004. Most of those authors attained their basic education in China 
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and received their Doctoral degree abroad. They are active in the international scientific 
community and also acquainted with China’s S&T system. 
 
Poo (2004) judged that the reform of the administrative structure and establishment of a 
merit-based system for staff evaluation and resource allocation is crucial for Chinese 
S&T institutes’ development in the next stage. He wrote down: “I am not aware of any 
research institutions in China that has terminated the contract of a scientist simply 
because of poor research performance – a common practice in major research institutions 
elsewhere.” Wu (2004) and Rao et al. (2004) also criticized that “the system for 
evaluating research proposals and distributing funds is far from ideal, and does not 
promote innovative research”. To support the judgment, they cited a popular saying in 
China: “Small grants, big review; medium grants, small review; big grants, no review.” 
In Wu’s opinion, this happened simply because the research project evaluation was 
limited by very low proportion of the outside reviewers and the serious cronyism, 
especially for the big projects. He also pointed out that China’s low-level output is related 
to the inadequate and short-term nature of its research funding, which pressed the 
scientists to produce quick results that lack novelty and creativity. Additionally, many 
researchers were worried about the misconduct inside the Chinese scientific community, 
such as fabrication, falsification and plagiarism, etc. (Li, 2004; Wang, 2004)  
 
Unlike the anxiety of the expatriate and domestic Chinese scientists about the recent S&T 
system reform, our concern is deduced from the quantitative economic analysis. However, 
our finding resonates with the cited criticism mainly originating from the subjective 
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observation of China’s S&T institutes. The worsening scientific productivity of China’s 
S&T institutes since 1990s obviously requests the greater efforts of the future reform 
policy, which is expected to emphasize the continuous improvement of the funding 
system, strengthening the internal management and fighting misconduct activities.  
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
The “Resolution” issued in 1985 launched the reform of China’s centrally-planned S&T 
system. The objective of the reform was to transform the rigid, segmented and inefficient 
plan-oriented S&T system into a highly dynamic, interactive and efficient system such as 
those in the leading industrialized countries. In this transformation, two fundamental 
tasks need to be well accomplished, namely, 1) establishing the effective linkage across 
the agents inside the S&T system and 2) enhancing the scientific productivity of the S&T 
system. Whether the two tasks have been accomplished and how well they have been 
achieved in a large degree is decided by the reform performance in China. 
 
In the past 20 years, numerous policies regarding S&T system transformation have been 
implemented in China. The analysis of the successful policies are centered on three 
policy groups, i.e. reform the R&D funding system, improve R&D management in the 
S&T institutes and strengthen the industry-academy relationship. The study of two 
institutes affiliated to the Chinese Academy of Science examines the impacts of the 
reform policy in the micro-level. The performance improvement of the two institutes 
 29 
after 1998 is well explained by the successful policy measures in the framework of 
“Knowledge Innovation Program”.  
 
In order to evaluate the policy performance during the reform period, we calculate the 
scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes based on the data from two different 
sources. The result reveals in China’s S&T institutes the full effect of the R&D 
investment on the international publication takes 7 years to occur and its total effect on 
patent application lasts 5 years. The long term elasticity of publishing the international 
papers and R&D project expenditure is around 0.8 and the elasticity of patent application 
and R&D investment is approximately 2. That is, a 1 percent increase of the R&D 
investment in China’s S&T institutes leads to 0.8 percent growth of the international 
papers and 2 percent growth of the patent application.  
 
The most important finding in this paper is the deteriorating scientific productivity in 
China’s S&T institutes since 1990s. The result based on the aggregate data shows the 
average annual growth rate of scientific productivity is -2.9 percent when the output is 
measured by the publication data, and is -9.5 percent when the output is measured by the 
patent data. This result is confirmed by the analysis based on the provincial data. We 
calculate the scientific productivity of the S&T institutes in the eleven provinces, which 
concentrated around 80 percent of national resources invested to the S&T institutes. The 
weighted average growth rates are negative, whenever the output is measured by the 
publication or patent data. 
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The deteriorating scientific productivity certainly casts doubt on the policy impacts of the 
on-going Chinese S&T system reform. This finding resonated with the anxiety of some 
expatriate and domestic Chinese scientists about the drawbacks of the current S&T 
reform. The evidence of the declining scientific productivity of China’s S&T institutes 
since 1990s obviously requests greater efforts of the future reform policy, which is 
expected to emphasize the continuous improvement of the funding system, strengthening 
the internal management and fighting misconduct activities.  
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Table 1: Output Indicators for Chinese S&T System: 1991 – 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 1, Institute of Scientific and Technological Information in China (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
              2, Chinese Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003. 
Year 
Number of 
China’s “Science 
Citation Index” 
(SCI) Papers1 
Ratio of 
China’s SCI 
Papers to 
World Total 
SCI Papers 
Patent 
Application of 
China’s S&T 
Institutes2 
Contract Value 
Registered in 
Technology Markets 
(Sellers are S&T 
Institutes) (Unit: 1,000 
RMB, 1990 Constant 
Price)2 
1991 6,630 1.07% 2,385 4,167,097 
1992 6,224 0.92% 2,541 6,078,776 
1993 9,617 1.28% 2,636 6,353,850 
1994 10,411 1.32% 2,540 5,629,851 
1995 13,134 1.54% 2,345 5,961,984 
1996 14,459 1.62% 2,835 5,942,453 
1997 16,883 1.84% 2,829 6,310,247 
1998 19,838 2.13% 2,872 8,141,753 
1999 24,476 2.51% 3,048 8,981,310 
2000 30,499 3.15% 4,122 9,028,356 
2001 35,685 N/A 4,360 9,745,492 
2002 40,800 4.18% 5,373 10,094,857 
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Table 2: S&T Papers Included in Science Citation Index Expanded, Engineering Index and Index to Scientific & Technical Proceedings: China and Several 
Countries 
 
Annual Growth Rate of the Country’s S&T Paper 
Country 
Rank of the Number of 
Total S&T Papers in the 
World in 2002 
Ratio of the 
Country’s S&T 
Papers to the Total in 
the World in 2002 
1999/1998 2000/1999 2001/2000 2002/2001 
UK 3 7.95% N.A. N.A. N.A. -4.36% 
Germany 4 7.35% N.A. N.A. 5.29% -4.41% 
China 5 5.37% 31.95% 7.56% 29.89% 19.94% 
France 6 5.13% N.A N.A 4.63% -4.25% 
Italy 7 3.84% -2.21% -2.86% 9.69% -1.55% 
Canada 8 3.62% 4.07% -4.46% 2.08% 0.20% 
Russia 9 2.89% 1.06% -1.60% -5.82% 11.83% 
Source: Institute of Scientific and Technological Information in China (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
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?able 3: S&T Institutes in China’s Innovation System: 1987-2002 
 
 Year S&T Institutes 
Ratio of value of 
S&T Institutes to 
the Sum 
Universities 
Ratio of the value of 
Universities to the 
Sum 
Enterprises 
Ratio of the value of 
Enterprises to the 
Sum 
19871 385.86 47.23% 178.29 21.82% 252.78 30.94% 
1995 345.00 44.86% 144.00 18.73% 280.00 36.41% R&D Personnel (Thousand Person Year, Full Time Equivalent) 
2002 206.00 25.40% 181.00 22.32% 424.00 52.28% 
19872 10.68 60.72% 0.70 3.98% 6.21 35.30% 
1995 14.64 44.30% 4.23 12.80% 14.174 42.89% R&D Expenditure (Billion RMB, Current Price) 
2002 35.13 33.71% 13.05 12.52% 56.024 53.76% 
19873 1,844 29.35% 1,360 21.65% 3,078 49.00% 
1995 865 34.26% 574 22.73% 1,086 43.01% 
Invention Patent Application in State 
Intellectual Property Office of P.R. 
China (Items) 
2002 3,429 15.33% 4,282 19.14% 14,657 65.53% 
1999 3,927 29.84% 9,214 70.03% 17 0.13% Science Citation Index Papers 
(Number) 5 2002 8,036 25.80% 23,028 73.94% 82 0.26% 
Source: Data of  1995 and 2002 are from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003.  
Note:   1, Data of 1987 are from Xue (1997). The data are the head count data.  
2, Data of 1987 are from Xue (1997). 
3, Data of 1987 are from Shen (1997). The data not only include the invention patent application, but also the utility model and the design patent 
application.  Therefore, their values are larger than those of the year 1995 in the table. 
            4, Data are specified in China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003 as “R&D Expenditure”. Their values are supposed to be larger than 
those of “Intramural R&D Expenditure” data. 
            5, Data are from Institute of Scientific and Technological Information in China (2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003). Data of 2002 are for “Science Citation 
Index Expended” papers. Data of 1999 are for “Science Citation Index” papers.  
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Table 4: The Discrepancies of the S&T System in Centrally Planned Economies and Market Economy Countries  
 
S&T System in the Centrally Planned Economy S&T System in the Market Economy 
• Strong influence from the political hierarchy and control; 
 
• Linear innovation model: 
o Innovation process is vertically segmented as basic research, 
applied research and experiment and development;  
o Innovation system is horizontally segmented by ministerial 
R&D branches; 
o Innovation push comes from the externalized R&D towards 
production; 
o Users are not the source of improvement and innovation; 
 
• Enterprises are only production units instead of being the center of 
the innovation; 
o R&D is “outsourced” to ministries or other organizations instead 
of being organized as an “in-house” activity; 
o Knowledge is accumulated more in design and engineering 
institutes than in enterprises; 
o Links between R&D and production are generally weak; 
 
• R&D fund is distributed on the basis of institutional (per personnel) 
funding instead of depending on the merit of the projects; 
 
• “Soft Budget Constrain” prevails inside the R&D units; 
o Low efficiency of the R&D activities; 
o Overstaffing is a serious problem. 
 
• Dynamic and interactive innovation system; 
o High mobility of the human resources, knowledge, capital inside the 
innovation system; 
o Demand for innovation comes from not only the “push side” such as the 
R&D institutes, but also the “pull side” such as the users and enterprises; 
 
 
 
 
 
• Industrial R&D is the driving force of the innovation activities; 
o Technology is firm-specific assets; 
o Enterprises accumulate the embodied knowledge through learning-by-doing 
in the specific organizational contexts; 
o Enterprises create the pull-demand for innovation; 
 
 
 
 
• R&D project is financed through the competitive selection of the proposals based 
on the merit of the project; 
 
• “Hard Budget Constraint” guarantees the efficiency in the daily operation and 
management of the R&D units.  
 
Source: Hanson and Pavitt (1987), Meske (1998), OECD (1969) and Radosevic (1999)  
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Table 5: Chinese Central Government’s Budgetary Expenditure and Appropriation for S&T: 1980-20021 
 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Budgetary Appropriation for S&T (Billion RMB. 
Constant Price. 1990=100) 10.91 10.17 10.80 12.94 14.78 14.54 15.25 14.67 13.93 13.51 13.91 15.06 
The Annual Growth Rate of Budgetary of Appropriation 
for S&T  -6.8% 6.2% 19.8% 14.3% -1.7% 4.9% -3.8% -5.1% -3.0% 3.0% 8.2% 
The Ratio of the Budgetary Appropriation for S&T to 
the Total Budgetary Expenditure 5.3% 5.4% 5.3% 5.6% 5.6% 5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 4.9% 4.5% 4.5% 4.7% 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
Budgetary Appropriation for S&T (Billion RMB. 
Constant Price. 1990=100) 16.43 17.10 16.96 16.89 18.39 21.39 23.51 29.80 31.25 37.73 44.04 
 
The Annual Growth Rate of Budgetary of Appropriation 
for S&T 9.2% 4.1% -0.8% -0.4% 8.9% 16.3% 9.9% 26.8% 4.8% 20.8% 16.7% 
 
The Ratio of the Budgetary Appropriation for S&T to 
the Total Budgetary Expenditure 5.1% 4.9% 4.6% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003. 
Note: 1, The original data are current price data. The constant price transformation is based on the GDP deflator provided by the World Bank. 
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Table 6: Unit Root Test of the Aggregate Data Series: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Method1 
 
Asymptotic Critical Values Null Hypothesis: The Data Series 
are Stationary 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin Test 
Statistic 1% level 5% level 10% level 
Logarithm of R&D Project 
Expenditure 1990 Constant Price 0.129737 
Logarithm of International Paper 0.161040 
Logarithm of Patent Application 0.133574 
0.216 0.146 0.119 
Note: 1, The exogenous variables in the regression include the constant term and linear trend.
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Table 7: R&D Input and Output of China’s S&T Institutes in Provincial Level 
 
Ratio of R&D Project Expenditure of Each 
Province to National Total  
Ratio of International Papers of 
Each Province to National Total   
Ratio of Patent Applications of 
Each Province to National Total 
1991 2003 1991 2003 1992 2003 Province 
Ratio Ranking Ratio Ranking Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio 
Bei Jing 31.7% 1 41.8% 1 42.0% 47.8% 23.7% 29.8% 
Liao Ning 5.5% 3 4.9% 3 7.6% 5.4% 9.4% 10.1% 
Ji Lin 5.4% 5 4.4% 5 4.9% 4.0% 4.1% 7.1% 
Shang Hai 12.3% 2 10.6% 2 12.1% 13.4% 7.5% 17.1% 
Jiang Su 4.4% 6 3.7% 6 3.5% 4.0% 4.2% 2.6% 
Shan Dong 2.3% 11 3.0% 9 1.6% 1.6% 6.3% 3.5% 
Hu Bei 2.8% 10 3.4% 8 2.0% 2.3% 3.2% 2.3% 
Guang Dong 3.1% 8 4.4% 4 4.9% 3.0% 2.7% 4.5% 
Si Chuan 5.5% 4 3.5% 7 1.9% 0.8% 4.7% 2.4% 
Shaan Xi 3.0% 9 1.5% 14 1.5% 0.8% 2.4% 1.5% 
Gan Su 3.1% 7 2.5% 10 3.6% 2.3% 2.4% 2.9% 
Sum of Total Thirty One 
Provinces’ Original Data1 1,258,153.74 3,809,492.93 7,425 10,884 2,007 4,377 
Sum of “Top Eleven” 
Provinces’ Original Data1  993,539.24 3,176,766.26 6,351 9,294 1,420 3,668 
Ratio of “Top Eleven” to 
Sum Total 79.0% 83.4% 85.5% 85.4% 70.8% 83.8% 
Source: Data Set of S&T Organizations 
Note:  1, Unit for “R&D Project Expenditure”: Thousand RMB, 1990 constant Price; Unit for “International Papers”: Piece of Paper; Unit for “Patent 
Application”: Piece of Patent Application.
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Table 8: Estimation Result of Function (2): International Papers and Patent Application 
 
 International Papers Patent Application 
 8Lags 7 Lags 6 Lags 6 Lags 5 Lags 4 lags 
Expenditure t0(0) 0.05927 0.04184 -0.02903 0.26160** 0.20100*** 0.19033** 
t
-1  (-1) -0.11599** -0.09994** -0.10137* 0.28676*** 0.25203*** 0.25715*** 
t
-2 (-2) -0.13319** -0.11333** -0.11543** 0.31193*** 0.30306*** 0.32397*** 
t
-3 (-3) -0.05024 -0.03743 -0.07361** 0.33710*** 0.35409*** 0.39079*** 
t
-4 (-4) 0.07499 0.08863** 0.02170 0.36226*** 0.40512*** 0.45761*** 
t
-5 (-5) 0.18459** 0.22574*** 0.16810** 0.38743*** 0.45615***  
t
-6 (-6) 0.22068** 0.33478*** 0.36321** 0.41260***   
t
-7 (-7) 0.12536 0.37662**     
t
-8 (-8) -0.15926      
Sum of Lags 0.20620 0.81692** 0.23356 2.35968*** 1.97143*** 1.61987*** 
Constant 7.309209 2.555524 7.054632*** -11.16723*** -8.125046*** -5.367869*** 
Time Trend Variable t 0.009567 -0.026481 0.015873 -0.118476*** -0.093469*** -0.072193*** 
AIC -3.474260 -3.719499 -3.193782 -2.063941 -2.967998 -2.100132 
SIC -3.292709 -3.502465 -2.951328 -1.902306 -2.794168 -1.917544 
Polynomial Degree Reduction 
Wald Coefficient Test (P value of F-statistics)       
5 to 4  0.9957   
 
 
4 to 3  0.5668   
 
 
3 to 2  0.0747*   0.6493  
2 to 1  
 
  0.5802  
1 to 0  
 
  0.0364**  
Note:  * : Significant at 0.1; **: Significant at 0.05; ***: Significant at 0.01. 
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Table 9: Scientific Productivity Growth Rate of China’s S&T Institutes: Aggregate Data 
 
 
Scientific Productivity 
Growth Rate in terms of 
International Paper 
Scientific Productivity Growth 
Rate in terms of Patent 
Application 
1991/1992 N.A. -15.3% 
1992/1993 N.A. -6.6% 
1993/1994 -4.8% -11.2% 
1994/1995 -3.5% -15.7% 
1995/1996 -0.2% 5.9% 
1996/1997 -7.3% -15.0% 
1997/1998 4.4% -11.9% 
1998/1999 -3.9% -11.8% 
1999/2000 -8.2% 0.0% 
2000/2001 1.5% -18.4% 
2001/2002 -1.6% -9.5% 
2002/2003 -5.5% -4.2% 
 Average Annual Growth Rate 
1991/2003  -9.5% 
1993/2003 -2.9%  
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Table 10:  Average Annual Scientific Productivity Growth Rate of the S&T Institutes in the “Top Eleven” Provinces: 
 
Province 
Average Annual 
Scientific Productivity 
Growth Rate in terms 
of International Paper 
Average Annual 
Scientific 
Productivity 
Growth Rate in 
terms of Patent 
Application 
 1998-2003 1996-2003 
Bei Jing -5.0% -7.1% 
Liao Ning -2.8% -4.2% 
Ji Lin 0.9% -2.1% 
Shang Hai 2.3% 3.6% 
Jiang Su -9.4% -18.5% 
Shan Dong -7.4% -23.0% 
Hu Bei -11.7% -7.2% 
Guang Dong -9.6% -6.6% 
Si Chuan -12.4% 1.3% 
Shaan Xi -16.1% -5.8% 
Gan Su 0.2% 1.4% 
Weighted 
Arithmetic 
Average1 
-4.8% -5.7% 
Result of Aggregate Data 
1998/2003 -3.5%  
1996/2003  -10.1% 
Note: The weight is the ratio of the each province’s “R&D Projects Expenditure” to sum of “top eleven” provinces’ “R&D Projects Expenditure”. 
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Source: Institute of Scientific and Technological Information in China (2003). 
Note: 1, The ranks of the countries descend from the left to the right. For instance, US ranked in 1st and Austria ranked in 20th.  
 
Figure 1: Ranking of the Total Citation Counts of the Countries (Regions)' Science Citation Index Expanded Papers: 1993-20031 
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Figure 2: Chinese S&T System in the Planned Economy 
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Figure 3: Chinese S&T System in the Market Economy 
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Data Source: OECD (2003).  
Note:   
1, The OECD countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. The selected non-OECD countries and regions include: Argentina, China, Israel, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia, 
Chinese Taipei. 
2, Countries Label: USA-United States; JPN- Japan; DEU-Germany; FRA-France; GBR- United Kingdom; RUS-Russian Federation; CHN-China; HUN-
Hungary; CZE- Czech Republic; POL-Poland; SLO-Slovenia; SVK- Slovak Republic; ROM-Romania. 
 
Figure 4: The “Triadic” Patent Families and Gross Expenditure on R&D in the OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries and Regions (1999 Data) 
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Data Source: OECD (2003).  
Note:    
1, The included OECD and non-OECD countries are the same as those in Figure 4.   
2, Countries Label: JPN- Japan; DEU-Germany; FRA-France; ITA-Italy; CAN-Canada; RUS-Russian Federation; CHN-China; HUN-Hungary; CZE- Czech 
Republic; POL-Poland; SLO-Slovenia; SVK- Slovak Republic; ROM-Romania. 
 
Figure 5: The “Triadic” Patent Families and Total R&D Personnel in the OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries and Regions (1999 Data) 
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Source: Various versions of China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology. 
 
Figure 6: China’s Gross Expenditure on R&D / GDP Ratio: 1978-2003 
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Source: Institute of Chemistry (2004?). 
 
Figure 7: Publication in Institute of Chemistry, Chinese Academy of Science: 1989-2002 
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Source: Institute of Chemistry (2004?). 
 
Figure 8: Patent Application and Patent Grant in Institute of Chemistry, Chinese Academy of Science: 1985-2003 
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Figure 9: R&D Input and Output in Chinese S&T Institutes: Aggregate Data 
 
